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Abstract
Both resources in the natural environment and concepts in a semantic space are
distributed “patchily”, with large gaps in between the patches. To describe people’s
internal and external foraging behavior, various random walk models have been
proposed. In particular, internal foraging has been modeled as sampling: in order
to gather relevant information for making a decision, people draw samples from a
mental representation using random-walk algorithms such as Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC). However, two common empirical observations argue against
simple sampling algorithms such as MCMC. First, the spatial structure is often best
described by a Lévy flight distribution: the probability of the distance between two
successive locations follows a power-law on the distances. Second, the temporal
structure of the sampling that humans and other animals produce have long-range,
slowly decaying serial correlations characterized as 1/f -like fluctuations. We
propose that mental sampling is not done by simple MCMC, but is instead adapted
to multimodal representations and is implemented by Metropolis-coupled Markov
chain Monte Carlo (MC3), one of the first algorithms developed for sampling from
multimodal distributions. MC3 involves running multiple Markov chains in parallel
but with target distributions of different temperatures, and it swaps the states of the
chains whenever a better location is found. Heated chains more readily traverse
valleys in the probability landscape to propose moves to far-away peaks, while
the colder chains make the local steps that explore the current peak or patch. We
show that MC3 generates distances between successive samples that follow a Lévy
flight distribution and 1/f -like serial correlations, providing a single mechanistic
account of these two puzzling empirical phenomena.
1 Introduction
In many complex domains, such as vision, motor control, language, categorization or common-sense
reasoning, human behavior is consistent with the predictions of Bayesian models (e.g., [3, 25, 5, 2,
14, 17, 37, 39]). Bayes’ theorem prescribes a simple normative method to combine prior beliefs with
new information to make inferences about the world. However, the sheer number of hypotheses that
must be considered in complex domains makes exact Bayesian inference intractable. Instead it must
be that individuals are performing some kind of approximate inference [34, 24].
Sampling is a way to perform approximation for Bayesian models in complex problems that makes
many difficult computations easy: instead of integrating over vast hypothesis spaces, samples
of hypotheses can be drawn from the posterior distribution. The computational cost of sample-
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based approximations only scales with the number of samples rather than the dimensionality of the
hypothesis space, though using small numbers of samples result in particular biases in inference.
Interestingly, the biases in inference that are introduced by using a small number of samples match
some of the biases observed in human behavior. For example, probability matching [34], anchoring
effects [18], and many reasoning fallacies [7, 24] can all be explained in this way. However, there
is as of yet no consensus on the exact nature of the algorithm used to sample from human mental
representations.
Previous work has posited that people either use direct sampling or Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) to sample from their posterior distribution over hypotheses [34, 18, 7, 24]. In this paper, we
demonstrate that these algorithms cannot explain two key empirical effects that have been found in a
wide variety of tasks. In particular, these algorithms do not produce distances between samples that
follow a Lévy flight distribution, and separately they do not produce autocorrelations that follow 1/f
scaling. To find a sampling algorithm that does match these empirical effects, we note that mental
representations have been shown to be “patchy” with high probability regions separated by large
regions of low probability. We then compare one of the first algorithms developed for sampling from
multimodal distributions, Metropolis-coupled MCMC (MC3), and demonstrates that it produces both
key empirical phenomena. Previously Lévy flight distributions and 1/f scaling have been explained
separately as the result of efficient search and the signal of self-organizing behavior respectively
[33, 31], and we provide the first account that can explain both phenomena as the result of the same
purposeful mental activity.
1.1 Spatial structure of mental samples
In the real world, resources are rarely distributed uniformly in the environment. Food, water, and other
critical nature resources often occur in spatially isolated patches with large gaps in between. Therefore,
humans and other animals’ foraging behaviors should adapt to such patchy environments. In fact,
foraging behaviors have been observed to display a Lévy flight, which is a class of random walk
whose step lengths follow a heavy-tailed power-law distribution [26]. In a Lévy flight distribution,
the probability of executing a jump of length l is given by:
P (l) ∼ l−µ (1)
where 1 < µ ≤ 3. The values µ ≤ 1 do not correspond to normalizable probability distributions.
Examples of mobility patterns following the Lévy flight has been recorded in Albatrosses [32], marine
predators [27], monkeys [21], and humans [13].
Lévy flights are advantageous in patchy environments where resources are sparsely and randomly
distributed because the probability of returning to a previously visited target site is smaller than in a
standard random walk. In the same patchy environment, Lévy flights can visit more new target sites
than a random walk does [4]. Interestingly, it has been proven that in foraging the optimal exponent
is µ = 2 regardless the dimensionality of the space if (1) the target sites are sparse, (2) they can be
visited any number of times, and (3) the forager can only detect and remember a target site in a close
vicinity [33].
Remarkably, mental representations of concepts are also patchy and the distance between mental
samples also follows a Lévy flight distribution. For example, in semantic fluency tasks (e.g., asking
participants to “name as many animals as you can”), the retrieved animals tend to form clusters
(e.g., pets, water animals, African animals) [30, 1]. This same task has also been found to produce
Lévy flight distributions of inter-response intervals (IRI) [23], which can be considered a measure of
distance between samples by making the reasonable assumption that there is a linear relationship
between IRI and mental distance1.
1There are various ways to make the link between IRI and distance between samples. One is to assume that
it takes longer to transition to a sample that is further away in the mental space. A second is to assume that while
generating any sample takes the same fixed amount of time, there are unreported samples that are generated
between each reported sample, and that the sampler has travelled further the more unreported samples that are
generated; unreported samples are plausible in this task because participants are only given credit for each new
animal name they report.
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1.2 Temporal structure of mental samples
Besides the spatial structure of the distance between two successive locations following a power-law
distribution, a number of studies has reported that the temporal structure of many cognitive activities
contains long-range, slowly decaying serial correlations. These correlations tend to follow a 1/f
scaling law [16]:
C(k) ∼ k−α (2)
where C(k) is the autocorrelation function of temporal lag k. The same phenomenon is often
expressed in the frequency domain:
S(f) ∼ f−α (3)
where f is frequency, S(f) is spectral power and α ∈ [0.5, 1.5] is considered 1/f scaling. The power
spectra can be derived from submitting the time series to Fourier analysis. 1/f noise is also known
as pink or flicker noise, which varies in predictability intermediately between white noise (no serial
correlation, S(f) ∼ 1/f0) and brown noise (no correlation between increments, S(f) ∼ 1/f2).
Note that Lévy flights are random walks so they do not produce 1/f noise, but 1/f2 noise instead.
1/f -like temporal fluctuations in human cognition were first reported in time estimation and spatial
interval estimation tasks in which participants were asked to repeatedly estimate a pre-determined
time interval of 1 second or spatial interval of 1 inch [12]. Subsequent studies have shown 1/f scaling
laws in the response times of mental rotation, lexical decision, serial visual search, and parallel visual
search [11], as well as the time to switch between different percepts when looking at a bistable
stimulus (i.e., a Necker cube [8]).
Given that sampling can be described as a Lévy flight spatially and has 1/f autocorrelations (see
Table 1 for summary), we now investigate which sampling algorithms can capture both the spatial
and temporal structure of human cognition.
Table 1: Key findings for 1/f noise and Lévy flight in human mental sampling
Papers Experiments Main findings
[12] Time interval estimation Power spectra slopes of [−1.2,−0.90]
Spatial interval estimation Power spectra slope of −1
[11] Mental rotation RT power spectra slope of −0.7
Lexical decision RT power spectra slope of −0.9
Serial search RT power spectra slope of −0.7
Parallel search RT power spectra slope of −0.7
[23] Memory retrieval task IRI power-law exponents µˆ ∈ [1.37, 1.98]
[22] Natural scene perception Eye movement trajectories follow both 1/f noise and Lévy flight
2 Sampling algorithms
We consider three possible sampling algorithms that might be employed in human cognition: Direct
Sampling (DS), Random walk Metropolis (RwM), and Metropolis-coupled MCMC (MC3). We define
DS as independently drawing samples in accord with the posterior probability distribution. DS is the
most efficient algorithm for sampling of the three, but it may not be possible to implement in human
cognition as it often requires calculating intractable normalizing constants that scale exponentially
with the dimensionality of the hypothesis space [19, 6]. DS has been used to explain biases in human
cognition such as probability matching [34].
MCMC algorithms can bypass the problem of the normalizing constant by simulating a Markov
chain that transitions between states according only to the ratio of the probability of hypotheses [19].
We define RwM as a classical Metropolis-Hastings MCMC algorithm, which can be thought of as a
random walker exploring the probability landscape of hypotheses, preferentially climbing the peaks
of the posterior probability distribution [20, 15]. However, with limited number of samples, RwM
is very unlikely to reach modes in the probability distribution that are separated by large regions of
low probability. This leads to biased approximations of the posterior distribution [28, 24]. Random
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walks have been used to model clustered responses in memory retrieval [1], and RwM in particular
has been used to model multistable perception [9], the anchoring effect [18], and various reasoning
biases [7, 24].
Our third algorithm is MC3, also known as parallel tempering or replica-exchange MCMC, was
one of the first algorithms to successfully tackle the problem of multimodality [10]. MC3 involves
running M Markov chains in parallel, each at a different temperature: T1, T2, ..., TM . In general,
1 = T1 < T2 < ... < TM , and T1 is the temperature of the interest where the target distribution is
unchanged. The purpose of the heated chains is to traverse valleys in the probability landscape to
propose moves to far-away peaks (by sampling from heated target distributions: pi1/T ), while the
colder chains make the local steps that explore the current probability peak or patch. MC3 decides
whether to swap the states between two randomly chosen chains in every iteration [10]. In particular,
swapping of chain i and j is accepted or rejected according to a Metropolis rule; hence, the name
Metropolis-coupled MCMC
Aswap = min{1, pi(xj)
1/Tipi(xi)
1/Tj
pi(xi)1/Tipi(xj)1/Tj
} (4)
Coupling induces dependence among the chains, so each chain is no longer Markovian. The stationary
distribution of the entire set of chains is thus
∏M
i=1 pi
1/Ti but we only use samples from the cold
chain (T = 1) to approximate the posterior distribution [10]. Pseudocode for MC3 is presented below.
Note that MC3 reduces to RwM when the number of parallel chains M = 1.
Algorithm Metropolis-coupled Markov chain Monte Carlo
1: Choose a starting point x1.
2: for t = 2 to L do
3: for m = 1 to M do B update all M chains
4: Draw a candidate sample x′ ∼ N (xmt−1, σ) B Gaussian proposal distribution
5: Sample u ∼ U [0, 1]
6: Am = min{1, [ pi(x′)pi(xmt−1) ]
1/Tm}
7: if u < Am then xmt = x′ else xmt = xmt−1 end if BMetropolis acceptance rule
8: end for
9: repeat floor(M/2) times B swapping scheme for Markov chains
10: Randomly select two chain i, j without repetition
11: Sample u ∼ U [0, 1]
12: Aswap = min{1, pi(xjt)1/Tipi(xit)1/Tj
pi(xit)
1/Tipi(xjt)
1/Tj
}
13: if u < Aswap then swap(xit, x
j
t ) end if BMetropolis-coupled swapping rule
14: end repeat
15: end for
3 Results
In this section, we evaluate whether the two key empirical effects of Lévy flights and 1/f auto-
correlations can be produced by the Direct Sampling (DS), Random walk Metropolis (RwM), and
Metropolis-coupled MCMC (MC3) algorithms.
3.1 Lévy flight
We simulated a 2D patchy environment with Nmode = 15 Gaussian mixtures where the means are
uniformly generated from [−r, r] for both dimensions, where r = 9 and the covariance matrix is
fixed as the identity matrix for all mixtures. This method will produce a patchy environment (for
example the top panel of Figure 1). We ran DS, RwM, and MC3 on this multimodal probability
landscape, and the first 100 positions for each algorithm can be found in the top panel of Figure
1. The empirical flight distances were obtained by calculating the Euclidean distance between two
consecutive positions of the sampler. For MC3, only the positions of the cold chain (T = 1) were
used.
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Power-law distributions should produce straight lines in a log-log plot. Therefore, the power-law
exponents were fitted by linear regression on the window-averaged log-binned flight distance data [23].
We used 10 non-overlapping windows that evenly split the x-axis, and cell means are represented in
the yellow filled dots in the bottom panel of Figure 1. Fitting the cell means provides a lower-variance
method for estimating the slope than fitting the log-binned data directly. Figure 1 (bottom panel)
shows that only MC3 can reproduce the distributional property of flight distance as a Lévy flight with
estimated power-law exponent µˆ = 1.27. Both DS (µˆ = −0.59) and RwM (µˆ = 0.91) 2 produced
values outside the range of a Lévy flight.
Figure 1: Searching behavior in a simulated 2D patchy environment of a 15 component Gaussian
mixture. (Left Panel) the trajectory of first 100 positions (red dots in top panel) and the log-log plot of
flight distance (bottom panel) for DS. The best-fitted lines used to estimate the Levy flight exponent
(bottom panel red dashed lines) were based on cell means using non-overlapping windows (yellow
filled dots) of the log-binned data (blue dots). (Middle Panel) the same plots for RwM algorithm. The
Gaussian proposal distribution was an identity covariance matrix. (Right Panel) the same plots for
MC3 algorithm with 8 parallel chains with only the cold chain shown here. The Gaussian proposal
distributions for all 8 chains had the same identity covariance matrix. For all the algorithms only the
first 1024 samples were used.
We then investigated the impact of spatial sparsity on the estimated power-law exponents. In this
simulation, the same number of Gaussian mixture were used but the range r was varied. The spatial
sparsity was computed as the mean distance between Gaussian modes. With small or moderate
spatial sparsity we found a positive relationship between spatial sparsity and the estimated power-law
exponents for both DS and MC3 (see Figure 2 left). In this range, only MC3 produced power-law
exponents in the range reported in human mental foraging studies (see Table 1), while both DS and
RwM failed to do so. For all three algorithms, once spatial sparsity was too great only a single mode
was explored and no large jumps were made.
We also checked whether MC3 really is more suitable to explore patchy mental representations than
RwM. In our simulated patchy environment, which used 15 identical Gaussian mixtures with identity
covariance matrix, an optimal sampling algorithm should visit each mode equally often, hence will
produce a uniform distribution of visit frequencies over all the modes. To this end, the effectiveness
of exploring the representation was examined by computing a Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL) [19]
between a uniform distribution over all modes and a the relative frequency of how often an algorithm
visited each mode:
2The log-binned data for RwM shows that the algorithm is certainly not producing a power-law as the
empirical flight distance distribution is not a straight line in the log-log plot
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DKL(H1:t||U) =
Nmode∑
i=1
H1:t log H1:t
1/Nmode
(5)
where U is a discrete uniform distribution, Nmode is the number of identical Gaussian mixtures, and
H is the empirical frequency of visited modes up to time t. Samples were assigned to the closest
mode when determining these empirical frequencies. The faster the KL divergence for an algorithm
reaches zero, the more effective the algorithm is at exploring the underlying environment and the DS
algorithm serves as a benchmark for the other two algorithms. As shown in Figure 2 (middle), MC3
quickly catches up to DS, while RwM lags far behind in exploring this patchy environment.
human
human
Figure 2: (Left) Estimated power-law exponents for flight distance distributions for the three sampling
algorithms, manipulating the spatial sparsity of the Gaussian mixture environment. Spatial sparsity
measurement was defined as the mean distance between modes. All three algorithms used the same
settings as in Figure 1. The dashed lines show the range of human data. (Middle) KL divergence of
mode visiting from the true distribution for the three sampling algorithms. The underlying patchy
environments are the same for all three algorithms. (Right) Simulated RwM with a Lévy flight
proposal distribution. Darker colors represent higher spatial sparsities. The dashed lines show the
range of human data.
Of course it may seem that we were simply using the wrong proposal distribution for RwM. Instead
of using a Gaussian proposal distribution we can use a Lévy flight proposal distribution, which will
straightforwardly produce Lévy flights if the posterior distribution is uniform over the entire space
(i.e., every proposed flight will be accepted). However, in a patchy environment a Lévy flight proposal
distribution will not typically produce a Lévy flight distribution of distances between samples that
has estimated power-law exponents in the range of human data, as also can be seen in Figure 2 (right)
with different spatial sparsities. The reason for this is that the long jumps in the proposal distribution
are unlikely to be successful: these long jumps often propose new states that lie in regions of nearly
zero posterior probability.
3.2 1/f noise
A typical interval estimation task requests participants to repeatedly produce an estimation for the
same target interval over many repeated trials [12, 11]. For instance, participants were first given an
example of a target interval (e.g., 1 second time interval or 1-inch spatial interval) and then repeated
the judgments again and again without feedback for up to 1000 trials. These time series produced by
human subjects showed 1/f noise, with an exponent close to 1. However, the log-log plot in human
data is typically observed flatten out for the highest frequencies [12]. This effect has been explained
as the result of two processes: fractional Brownian motion combined with white noise at the highest
frequencies [12].
Figure 3 shows an example of time series for the first 1024 samples generated by DS (left), RwM
(middle), and MC3 (right). We used a simple Gaussian target distribution in this simulation because
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the distribution of responses produced by participants was indistinguishable from a Gaussian [12].
Note that RwM and MC3 were initiated at the mode of the Gaussian distribution, and there was no
burn-in period in our simulation. This results show that only MC3 produces 1/f noise (αˆ = 1.01),
whereas DS produces white noise (αˆ = −0.01) and RwM is closest to brown noise (αˆ = 1.64). RwM
tends to generate brown noise because, if every proposed sample is accepted, then the algorithm
reduces to first-order autoregressive process (i.e., AR(1)) [38]. This is shown through simulation in
Figure 4: when the Gaussian width (σtarget) becomes much greater width of the Gaussian proposal
distribution (σproposal), RwM produces brown noise.
Figure 3: Sampling from a unimodal Gaussian N (0, 3). (Left Panel) the power spectra, traceplot,
and sample distribution of DS from top to bottom. The best-fitted lines in power spectra (top panel
purple dashed lines) are estimated based on block-averaged periodograms (green filled dots; [29]).
(Middle Panel) the same plots for RwM algorithm. (Right Panel) the same plots for MC3 algorithm
with 2 parallel chains and only the cold chain is shown here. The result will be similar to using 8
parallel chains if we restrict swapping between neighboring chains only. For all the algorithms here,
the first 1024 samples were used.
In contrast, MC3 has a tendency to produce 1/f noise when the acceptance rate is high. It has
been shown that the sum of as few as three AR(1) processes with widely distributed autoregressive
coefficients produces an approximation to 1/f noise [36]. As the higher-temperature chains can be
thought of as very roughly similar to AR(1) processes with lower autoregressive coefficients, this
may explain why the asymptotic behavior of the MC3 is 1/f noise.
What is also interesting about MC3 is that it is a single process that is able to produce both the 1/f
slope at lower frequencies as well as the flattening of the slope at higher frequencies, which was
ascribed to two different processes by [12]. The reason MC3 produces this result appears to be
because when two chains with similar temperatures find states with similar posterior probability they
will repeatedly swap back and forth, which can produce high frequency oscillations in the coldest
chain.
4 Discussion
Lévy flights are advantageous in a patchy world, and have been observed in many foraging task with
humans and other animals. A random walk with Gaussian steps does not produce the occasional
long-distance jump as a Lévy flight does. However, the swapping scheme between parallel chains of
MC3 enables it to produce Lévy-like scaling in the flight distance distribution. Additionally MC3
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Figure 4: Estimated slopes in the power spectra are related to the ratio between Gaussian width and
proposal step size. When the ratio is low, the acceptance rate of proposed sample should be low; it is
the opposite case for the high ratio. The asymptotic behaviors of MC3 are 1/f noise, of RwM are
brown noise, and of DS are white noise.
produces the long-range slowly-decaying temporal correlations of 1/f scaling. This long-range
dependence rules out any sampling algorithm that draws independent samples from the posterior
distribution, such as DS, since the sample sequence would have no serial correlation (i.e., white
noise). It also rules out RwM because the current sample solely depends on the previous sample.
Both of these results suggest that the algorithms people use to sample mental representations are
more complex than DS or RwM, and, like MC3, are instead adapted to sampling from multimodal
distributions.
However, if people are adapted to multimodal distributions, their behavior appears to have the
same temporal pattern even when they are actually sampling from a unimodal distribution. In
Gilden’s experiments, the overall distribution of estimated intervals (i.e., ignoring serial order) was
not multimodal, instead it was indistinguishable from a Gaussian distribution [12]. Assuming that the
posterior distribution in the hypothesis space is also unimodal then it is somewhat inefficient to use
MC3 rather than simple MCMC. Potentially the brain is hardwired to use particular algorithms, or it
is slow to adapt to unimodal representations because it is very difficult to know that a distribution is
unimodal rather than just a single mode in a patchy space.
Previous explanations of scale-free phenomenon in human cognitions such as self-organized criticality
argue that 1/f noise is generated from the interactions of many simple processes that produce such
hallmarks of complexity [31]. Other explanations assume that it is due to a mixture of scaled processes
like noise in attention or noise in our ability to perform cognitive tasks [35]. These approaches argue
that 1/f noise is a general property of cognition, and do not tie it to other empirical effects. Our
explanation of this scale-free process is more mechanistic, assuming that they reflect the cognitive
need to gather vital resources in a multimodal world. While autocorrelations make samplers less
effective when sampling from simple distributions, they may need to be tolerated in a multimodal
world in order to sample other isolated modes.
Of course, we do not claim that MC3 is the only sampling algorithm that is able to produce both 1/f
noise and Lévy flights. It is possible that other algorithms that deal better with multimodality than
MCMC, such as running multiple non-random walk Markov chains in parallel or Hamiltonian Monte
Carlo, could produce similar results. Future work will explore which algorithms can match these key
human data.
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